En el 36 Japón se largó a una carrera naval que no podía ganar.
The sheer number of ships being built between 1937 and 1941 was impressive enough, but in ships completed during those years the us navy still outpaced the Japanese in every type but aircraft carriers, where the United States commissioned just four. In a further ominous sign, Japan’s build-up reflected practically the maximum that its economy and industry could support, while the concurrent American effort was a relatively insignificant sideshow to an economy still on a peacetime footing.
In 1937, the first year since 1921 with no international limits on naval construction, both the United States and Japan spent just over $1 billion on defence, but while the us total represented just 1.5 per cent of a national income of $68 billion, the Japanese figure was 28 per cent of a national income of only $4 billion.
Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese navy fell only further behind, overwhelmed by the wartime production of the United States. During those years Japan completed 1 battleship (the Musashi), 10 carriers, 5 cruisers, 61 destroyers and 121 submarines, while the us navy added 8 battleships, 112 carriers (including 82 escort carriers), 48 cruisers, 354 destroyers and 203 submarines.
Lawrence Sondhaus, Navies in Modern World History, p. 213
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la "mateca o cañones" viene de lejos almirante de la mar océano lord cattaneo ok ktulu : fijate lo que eran ambos pbi y lo que incidió el gasto militar en cada uno de ellos...
con esos números, era jaque mate al emperador, pero supongo que nadie sabía en cuantas jugadas...
Si, como los ponjas también veían el problema, es interesante las distintas posiciones que asumían a partir del diagnóstico:
The Washington Naval Conference (1921–2) and the
subsequent regime of naval arms limits split the officer corps
into two mutually hostile groups: a moderate, realist ‘treaty faction’
and a belligerent, hard-line ‘fleet faction’. The realists, led
by navy minister Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, believed Japan’s
limited industrial strength would doom the country’s chances in
a naval race or future naval war against the United States. From
the start he accepted Secretary Hughes’s 5:5:3 proposal as the
best possible deal for Japan, even though it sacrificed the navy’s
hallowed ‘70 per cent standard’ vis-à-vis the American fleet and
his own goal of an ‘eight-eight’ force of battleships and battle
cruisers. The leader of the hard-liners, Naval Staff College president
Vice Admiral Kanji Kato, acknowledged Japan’s industrial
weakness but argued that this factor made it all the more important
for the navy to be free to build the strongest possible force in
peacetime, to compensate for the inability of the country’s industrial
base to augment the strength of the fleet in a hurry once war
appeared imminent. The hard-liners were realistic at least in
that they knew Japan’s hopes in a future war against one or both
of the leading naval powers would hinge on a decisive early victory,
which a fleet entering hostilities in a state of numerical
inferiority could not possibly achieve. During the Washington negotiations Kanji Kato considered anything less than parity
with the United States and Britain a dishonourable bargain.
Tomosaburo Kato prevailed only because he had seniority over
Kanji Kato, and covered himself by gaining approval for the
5:5:3 ratio from all key political and naval figures in Tokyo.
Nevertheless, the acrimonious episode featured such un-
Japanese behaviour as the junior Kato going over the head of the
senior Kato by wiring Tokyo from Washington to express his
dissent. At the moment the Japanese delegation agreed to the
5:5:3 ratio, a defiant Kanji Kato declared that ‘as far as I am concerned,
war with America starts now’
p. 217-218
sobre la fabricación de los "zero" había una leyenda: parece ser que eleanor roosevelt había quedado enamorada de kioto durante un viaje por lo le había hecho prometer a su marido que nunca se bombardearía la ciudad.
esto llegó a la inteligencia japonesa, por lo que la planta que los fabricaba se instaló en los alrededores...
Que buen chimento Hugo-San, no lo conocía. Es cierto, Kyoto casi no fue bombardeado. Era buen candidato con el cual evaluar los daños de una bomba atómica.
por si querés curiosear, en un librería de m t de alvear pasando uruguay y hacia callao, vereda de los pares, vi ayer en la vidriera varios libros sobre temas aparentemente no muy trillados sobre la segunda guerra según parecía desprenderse de sus títulos...
Ultimately Guadalcanal was
lost because the United States could reinforce and resupply its
forces on the island, while Japan could not. After the island was
abandoned, devastating losses in shipping would cripple
Japanese efforts to sustain garrisons on other islands they had
occupied in their initial conquest of the western Pacific. In eight
months alone (March–October 1943) the Japanese lost
1,052,740 tons of shipping, including 676,410 tons in military
and naval transport vessels, two-thirds of it sunk by American
submarines
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